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Abstract—Authentication is one of the security services that en-
sures sufficient security of the system by identification and verifi-
cation. Also, it assures the identity of the communicating party to 
be that the claimed one. To build a quantum channel between two 
unauthenticated to each other parties, first, a trusted authority is 
needed to establish a mutual authentication with each party. Using 
Bell measurement and entanglement swapping, we present a pro-
tocol that mutually authenticates the identity of the sender and the 
receiver, then constructs a quantum channel based on Bell basis. 
After, the sender and the receiver use the quantum channel to 
communicate using entanglement-assisted quantum communica-
tion protocols. Additionally, the protocol renews the shared secret 
key between the trusted authority and each user after each authen-
tication process. The protocol provides the necessary authentica-
tion and key distribution to create a quantum channel between the 
sender and receiver. 
Keywords— quantum; entanglement; authentication; bell meas-
urement; bell basis 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The field of quantum computing and information processing 
uses the laws of quantum physics, including states superposition 
and entanglement. Quantum cryptography is amongst the most 
surprising application of quantum mechanics in quantum com-
puting and information processing. Unlike classical cryptog-
raphy, which depends on the computational complexity of solv-
ing difficult mathematical problems such as, the public-key 
algorithm of the RSA. Quantum key distribution offers a method 
of sharing a private key with unconditional security. By applying 
the laws of quantum mechanics, messages and secret keys can 
be hidden and securely shared over a quantum channel between 
a sender and a receiver. For instance, one can use quantum key 
distribution protocols to share secret keys or use quantum direct 
communication to send messages. Bennett and Brassard were 
the first to propose the quantum key distribution protocol BB84 
in 1984 [1]. After, the field of quantum computing and infor-
mation processing became an active research area. Thus, many 
protocols in quantum communication and information pro-
cessing have been proposed. For example, some of the quantum 
protocols are quantum secret sharing [2-8], quantum secure di-
rect communication [9-14] and quantum identity authentication 
[13, 15-20]. Quantum secret sharing is the transformation of 
classical secret sharing to quantum information processing and, 
it can be used classical and quantum messages. Quantum secure 
direct communication protocol provides a secure method to send 
a secret message without prior sharing of a secret key. Classical 
cryptography has an extensive research on identity and message 
authentication. In the field of quantum information processing, 
quantum identity authentication is the natural generalization of 
the classical authentication. For instance, the quantum authenti-
cation and key distribution protocol presented in [16]. Identity 
authentication and simultaneous secret key distribution protocol 
presented in [21]. In addition, two protocols were presented in 
[13] for quantum user identification and secure direct communi-
cation. The protocols use the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger 
states for authentication and then secure communication. 
One of the most fundamental elements of quantum cryptog-
raphy is quantum entanglement. Quantum entanglement has no 
classical counterpart, which is a nonlocal correlation between 
two quantum subsystems. In 1991, Ekert [22] presented the first 
entanglement-based quantum key distribution protocol to share 
private secret keys. For example, if Alice and Bob have many 
prior shared maximally entangled pairs, then for each pair they 
perform measurement in any bases. After, on the classical chan-
nel they disclose the measurement basis used on each pair. The 
results should be correlated if they used the same basis. Pairs 
measured in different bases can be used to detect the presence of 
Eve by Bell’s inequality. Entrapment swapping [23, 24] is a tech-
nique that makes two non-directly interacted systems entangled 
with each other. Using entanglement swapping led to presenting 
new quantum key distribution protocol [25-30].  
In this paper, we assume that a sender (Alice) wishes to com-
municate with a receiver (Bob) but they are untrusted to each 
other and do not have access to a quantum channel nor they share 
entanglement. So, Alice contacts the trust authority Trent, who 
can authenticate each user using a prior shared secret key be-
tween them. Trent will distribute many two-particle entangled 
pairs with each party for authentication and communication. The 
goal is to verify and authenticate the identity of each user then, 
creates a quantum channel based on Bell basis. Trent renews the 
secret key between him and the users after each authentication. 
In the communication process, Alice and Bob use the entangle-
ment-based quantum channel to communicate using entangle-
ment-assisted communication protocol. The organization of the 
paper is as follows: the related work in section II, the proposed 
protocol in section III, the security analysis in section IV, and the 
conclusion in section V. 
II. RELATED WORK 
In the literature, there are different quantum authentication 
protocols [19, 31-33]. The protocols in [32, 33] are based on en-
tanglement swapping and Bell state measurement. In addition, 
they have three participants in the protocols, a sender Alice, who 
wishes to communicate with a remote receiver Bob and Trent 
who is a trusted party. Trent will try to help and build an authen-
ticated quantum communication channel between Alice and 
Bob. In the presented scheme registration, authentication and 
communication are the three main components. Next, we review 
the scheme presented in [33]. The protocol has three processes, 
which are registration, authentication, and communication.   
A. Registration: 
Suppose that each of Alice and Bob shares 	݉ bits secret key 
with the trusted authority Trent. Alice and Trent share the secret 
key ܭ்஺ = {ܭ்஺ଵ , ܭ்஺ଶ , … , ܭ்஺௠ , }. Also, Bob and Trent share the 
secret key ܭ்஻ = {ܭ்஻ଵ , ܭ்஻ଶ ,… , ܭ்஻௠ , } . The key distribution 
method was the quantum key distribution protocol in [27] to 
guarantee the unconditional security. Alice asks Trent to com-
municate with Bob. Then, Trent starts the authentication process 
by using the prior shared secret keys ܭ்஺	 and ܭ்஻ with Alice 
and Bob respectively. For each secret key, Trent derives a set of 
bases from the bases ܤ௭ = {|0〉, |1〉}  and 	ܤ௫ = {|+〉, |−〉}  for 
Alice and Bob called secret bases ஺ܵ	  and 	ܵ஻  respectively. 
Where, the bases ܤ௭ and ܤ௫ correspond to the secret key ݅ − ݐℎ 
bit of “0” and “1” respectively. Trent authenticates the identity 
of Alice and Bob by creating and sending a random secret se-
quence encoded by the secret bases. For Alice, Trent creates: 
	 	்ܵ஺௠ = {ݏ்஺ଵ , ݏ்஺ଶ , … ݏ்஺௠ }	 (1)
and for Bob, Trent creates: 
	 	்ܵ஻௠ = {ݏ்஻ଵ , ݏ்஻ଶ , … ݏ்஻௠ }	 (2)
If Alice and Bob are the legitimate users, then they can use their 
shared secret key with Trent to derive the secret bases and de-
code the secret sequence. Therefore, Trent meets with each user 
on the classical channel to verify the result. They continue the 
protocol if both got the correct secret sequences or abandon the 
channel if one of them got the wrong result. 
B. Authentication: 
After the authentication of Alice and Bob identities, Trent 
starts building the quantum channel. Trent aims to create a quan-
tum channel consists of two-particle maximally entangled states 
{|Ψ±〉, |Φ±〉}. So, Trent prepares 	ܮ maximally entangled pairs 
shared between him and Alice: 
	 	|δ୘୅(݅)〉 = {|δ୘୅(1)〉, |δ୘୅(2)〉, … |δ୘୅(ܮ)〉} (3)
also, another 	ܮ pair shared between him and Bob: 
	 	|ζ୘୆(݆)〉 = {|ζ୘୆(1)〉, |ζ୘୆(2)〉, … |ζ୘୆(ܮ)〉} (4)
where |δ, ζ〉 ∈ 	 {|Ψ±〉, |Φ±〉} . After, Trent keeps his particles 
which |δ୘(݅)〉 and	|ζ୘(݆)〉. Then, he sends the particles |δ୅(݅)〉 
and |ζ୆(݆)〉 to Alice and Bob respectively. Trent makes another 
authentication by asking each party to perform Bell basis meas-
urement on ݇ random pairs. For instance, if the chosen random 
state is ݎ  then Bell measurement should be performed on 
|δ୅(ݎ)〉|δ୅(ݎ + 1)〉 and |ζ୆(ݎ)〉|ζ୆(ݎ + 1)〉 for Alice and Bob 
respectively. After that, each party meets Trent on the classical 
channel to inform him of the chosen states and the measure-
ments result. Trent verifies that the results of each party confirm 
the entanglement swapping of Bell states by performing Bell ba-
sis measurement on the chosen states. Trent continues the proto-
col if both parties obtained correct states. 
C. Communication: 
After successfully authenticated Alice and Bob, Trent is 
ready to create the quantum channel. First, Trent discards the 
used entanglement and asks Alice and Bob to discard them as 
well. The total remaining states in Trent possession will be 
{|δ୘(݅)〉, |ζ୘(݆)〉} where ݅ = ݆ = 1,2, . . ܮ − ܭ. Also, the remain-
ing states in the possession of Alice and Bob will be {|δ୅(݅)〉} 
and {	|ζ୆(݆)〉} respectively where 	݅ = ݆ = 1,2, . . ܮ − ܭ . After, 
Trent performs Bell basis measurement on the remaining states 
shared between him each party where (݅ = ݆) . For instance, 
Trent performs Bell basis measurement on {|δ୘(݅)〉 ⊗ |ζ୘(݆)〉} 
which will cause entanglement swapping making the states of 
Alice and Bob {|δ୅(݅)〉, |ζ୆(݆)〉} in one of Bell entangled states. 
Finally, Alice and Bob use an entanglement-assisted communi-
cation protocol such as quantum teleportation for communica-
tion. 
The protocol presented in [34] is a bidirectional quantum se-
cure direct communication with authentication. The communi-
cation channel between the sender Alice and the receiver Bob is 
based on two-particle prior shared entanglement. Alice and Bob 
encode their secret key and the secret message by Pauli opera-
tors ߪூ, ߪ௑, ߪ௓, and ߪ௒. Also, they use the shared entanglement 
for authentication and secret key generating with help of 2ܰ and 
2ܯ bits of classical communication. Moreover, Alice and Bob 
previously agree to encode the two bits 00,01,10,	and 11	with 
Pauli operators	ߪூ, ߪ௑, ߪ௓, and ߪ௒ respectively: 
ߪூ = |0〉〈0| + |1〉〈1|	 (5)
ߪ௑ = |0〉〈1| + |1〉〈0|	 (6)
ߪ௓ = |0〉〈0| − |1〉〈1|	 (7)
ߪ௒ = |0〉〈1| − |1〉〈0|	 (8)
The protocol has eight steps. First, Alice prepares 2ܰ +
2ܯᇱ + ߜ entangled pairs chosen randomly from Bell states then, 
shares them with Bob. Second, Bob randomly selects ߜ states 
from his entangled states then randomly measures them in 
ߪ௑	݋ݎ	ߪ௓. After, Bob informs Alice of the chosen state and their 
results through the classical channel. After that, Alice performs 
the same measurement on the same state then compares them 
with the results received from Bob. Third, using the remaining 
entanglement Alice encodes a secret key. Fourth, Bob perform 
measurement on the chosen state by Alice then announce the re-
sult through the classical channel. Fifth, Alice informs Bob of 
the position of the secret key states so, Bob perform the neces-
sary decoding. Six, Alice encodes the secret message using the 
secret key. Seven, Bob perform Bell measurement then confirms 
with Alice the results through the classical channel. Eight, Alice 
informs Bob of the state of the direct communication and the 
updated authentication key. They use the direct communication 
states to send secret messages using Bell basis measurement. 
III. QUANTUM MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION SCHEME BASED 
ON BELL STATE MEASUREMENT 
The previous protocols especially [32, 33] do not offer mu-
tual authentication and depend on the trusted authority to au-
thenticate the users. Without mutual authentication, the com-
municating parties have no confidence they are connected with 
the trusted authority. Therefore, attacks such as replay and man-
in-the-middle are possible. In our proposed protocol, we secure 
the registration process by mutual authentication. Also, renews 
the secret key after each use by distributing a new secret key 
after each successful authentication. 
A. Mutual Authentication and Registration: 
Consider a network of ݊ users ݑ௜ where 	݅ is the user identi-
fication number ݑ௜ ∈ ܷ = {ݑଵ, ݑଶ, … , ݑ௡} . Each user shares a 
secret key ்݇௨ଶ௠ ∈ ܭ = {்݇௨ଵ , ்݇௨ଶ , … , ்݇௨ଶ௠}  of size 2݉  where ்݇௨ଶ௠ = {்݇௨ଵ௠ + ்݇௨ଶ௠ } with the trusted user Trent. We assume 
that the key exchange occurred during the setup of each user in 
the network. If Alice wishes to communicate with Bob, then she 
contacts Trent who knows every user in the network. At the be-
ginning, Trent and Alice need to build mutual authentication by 
identification and verification of each’s identity. They use the 
shared secret key ்݇஺ଶ௠ = {்݇஺ଵ௠ + ்݇஺ଶ௠ } to derive the encoding 
bases ்ܾ஺ଶ௠ = {்ܾ஺ଵ௠ + ்ܾ஺ଶ௠ }  from the bases 	ܤ௭	 = {|0〉, |1〉} 
and the bases 	ܤ௫ = {|+〉, |−〉}. For each bit in the secret key, 
they make the bits “0” and “1” correspond to bases 	ܤ௭	 and 	ܤ௫ 
respectively. After, Trent and Alice each generate a random se-
quence ்ܵ஺ and ஺்ܵ respectively of size	݉, then encoded it by 
the bases ்ܾ஺ଵ௠ . Next, Trent and Alice exchange the encoded se-
quences. So, the legitimate Trent and Alice must be able to de-
rive the decoding bases 	்ܾ஺ଵ௠  from the secret key ்݇஺ଵ௠  then de-
code the each other’s sequence. After, they meet on the classical 
channel. Trent announces Alice’s ஺ܵ௠்   and Alice announces 
Trent’s sequence 	்ܵ஺௠  . Trent and Alice verify their sequences 
then, they continue if they received the correct sequences so that 
they are mutually authenticated. If one of them received the 
wrong sequence then, they abandon the channel. After that, 
Trent contacts Bob and performs the same authentication pro-
cess. Trent and Bob use the shared secret key ்݇஻ଶ௠ ={்݇஻ଵ௠ + ்݇஻ଶ௠ }  to derive the encoding bases ்ܾ஺ଶ௠ = {்ܾ஻ଵ௠ +்ܾ஻ଶ௠ } . Next, Each of Trent and Bob generates a random se-
quence ்ܵ஻௠  and ܵ஻௠்  respectively of size	݉ then, encode it by 
bases ்ܾ஻ଵ௠  . After, Trent and Bob exchange the encoded se-
quences then meet on the classical channel to verify their se-
quences. Trent and Bob verify the sequences ்ܵ஻௠  and ܵ஻௠்  re-
spectively then, they continue if both received the correct 
sequences or they abandon the channel. If no one abandoned the 
channel then, Trent and Alice, as well as Trent and Bob, are mu-
tually authenticated. Further, Trent will provide Alice and Bob 
with a secret key to create a secret sequence for authenticating 
before communication. Trent encodes the second part of Bob’s 
secret key ்݇஻ଶ௠  by ்ܾ஺ଶ௠  then sends it to Alice. Also, Trent en-
codes the second part of Alice’s secret key ்݇஺ଶ௠  using ்ܾ஻ଶ௠  then 
sends to Bob. 
B. Secret Key Distribution: 
Trent builds the quantum channel after he created the mutual 
authentication between him and each of Alice and Bob. For each 
user, Trent prepares ܮ random Bell basis: 
|Υ(ܮ)〉்௨ = {|Υ(1)〉்௨, |Υ(2)〉்௨,… , |Υ(L)〉்௨} (9)
where |Υ〉 ∈ {|Ψି〉, |Ψା〉, |Φି〉, |Φା〉}  then shares them with 
the user. Also, let ݅ and ݆ be the indexes of Alice and Bob states 
respectively where ݅ = ݆ = ݐ + ݍ + ݌ = ܮ. Trent shares the en-
tangled pairs |Υ(݅)〉்஺ with Alice by keeping the first particle of |Υ(݅)〉் and sending the second particle |Υ(݅)〉஺ to Alice. Like-
wise, Trent shares the entangled pairs |Υ(݆)〉்஻ with Bob by 
keeping the first particles |Υ(݆)〉் and sending the second parti-
cle 	|Υ(݆)〉஻ to Bob. After, Alice randomly chooses (ݐ + ݍ)/2 
inconsecutive states of her entanglement with Trent |Υ(ܮ)〉்஺	 
then performs Bell measurement on the state |Υ(݅)〉்஺	 ⊗|Υ(݅ + 1)〉்஺ . For example, if the random state ݅ is |Φା(݅)〉ଵଶ 
and the state ݅ + 1 is |Φା(݅ + 1)〉ଷସ where the particles 1 and 4 
belong to Trent and the particles 2 and 3 belong to Alice. Then, 
Bell measurement on |Φା〉ଵଶ ⊗ |Φା〉ଷସ will give one result of {|Φା〉ଵସ|Φା〉ଶଷ} , {	|Φି〉ଵସ|Φି〉ଶଷ} , {|Ψା〉ଵସ|Ψା〉ଶଷ} , or |Ψି〉ଵସ|Ψି〉ଶଷ each occurs with a probability of	1/4 . If Alice 
finds the state |Ψା〉ଶଷ  then the state Trent holds should be |Ψା〉ଵସ. All the possible outcomes of Bell measurement when 
the state ݅ equals to Bell state |Φା〉ଵଶ are: 
Φଵଶା ⊗Φଷସା = Φଵସା Φଶଷା ,ΦଵସିΦଶଷି, Ψଵସା Ψଶଷା ,ΨଵସିΨଶଷି (10)
Φଵଶା ⊗Φଷସି = Φଵସା Φଶଷି, ΦଵସିΦଶଷା ,Ψଵସା Ψଶଷି, ΨଵସିΨଶଷା (11)
Φଵସା ⊗Ψଷସା = Φଵସା Ψଶଷା ,ΦଵସିΨଶଷି, Ψଵସା Φଶଷା ,ΨଵସିΦଶଷି (12)
Φଵଶା ⊗Ψଷସି = Φଵସା Ψଶଷି, ΦଵସିΨଶଷା ,Ψଵସା Φଶଷି, ΨଵସିΦଶଷା (13)
If the state ݅ equals to |Φି〉ଵଶ, then all the possible outcomes of 
Bell measurement are: 
Φଵଶି ⊗ Φଷସି = Φଵସା Φଶଷା ,ΦଵସିΦଶଷି, Ψଵସା Ψଶଷା ,ΨଵସିΨଶଷି (14)
Φଵଶି ⊗ Ψଷସି = Φଵସା Ψଶଷା ,ΦଵସିΨଶଷି, Ψଵସା Φଶଷା ,ΨଵସିΦଶଷି (15)
Φଵଶି ⊗ Φଷସା = Φଵସା Φଶଷି, ΦଵସିΦଶଷା ,Ψଵସା Ψଶଷି, ΨଵସିΨଶଷା (16)
Φଵଶି ⊗ Ψଷସା = Φଵସା Ψଶଷି, ΦଵସିΨଶଷା ,Ψଵସା Φଶଷି, ΨଵସିΦଶଷା (17)
If the state ݅ equals to |Ψା〉ଵଶ, then all the possible outcomes of 
Bell measurement are: 
Ψଵଶା ⊗Ψଷସା = Φଵସା Φଶଷା ,ΦଵସିΦଶଷି, Ψଵସା Ψଶଷା ,ΨଵସିΨଶଷି (18)
Ψଵଶା ⊗Ψଷସି = Φଵସା Φଶଷି, ΦଵସିΦଶଷା ,Ψଵସା Ψଶଷି, ΨଵସିΨଶଷା (19)
Ψଵଶା ⊗Φଷସା = Φଵସା Ψଶଷା ,ΦଵସିΨଶଷି, Ψଵସା Φଶଷା ,ΨଵସିΦଶଷି (20)
Ψଵଶା ⊗Φଷସି = Φଵସା Ψଶଷି, ΦଵସିΨଶଷା ,Ψଵସା Φଶଷି, ΨଵସିΦଶଷା (21)
If the state ݅ equals to |Ψି〉ଵଶ, then all the possible outcomes of 
Bell measurement are: 
Ψଵଶି ⊗ Ψଷସି = Φଵସା Φଶଷା ,ΦଵସିΦଶଷି, Ψଵସା Ψଶଷା ,ΨଵସିΨଶଷି (22)
Ψଵଶି ⊗ Ψଷସା = Φଵସା Φଶଷି, ΦଵସିΦଶଷା ,Ψଵସା Ψଶଷି, ΨଵସିΨଶଷା (23)
Ψଵଶି ⊗ Φଷସି = Φଵସା Ψଶଷା ,ΦଵସିΨଶଷି, Ψଵସା Φଶଷା ,ΨଵସିΦଶଷି (24)
Ψଵଶି ⊗ Φଷସା = Φଵସା Ψଶଷି, ΦଵସିΨଶଷା ,Ψଵସା Φଶଷି, ΨଵସିΦଶଷା (25)
For each measurement result, Alice will represent the states |Φ〉 
and |Ψ〉 by the bits "0" and "1" respectively. In the same man-
ner, she represents the phase of the states " + " and " − " by the 
bits "0" and	"1"	 respectively Fig. 1. For error detection, Alice 
meets with Trent on the classical channel to inform him of the 
ݐ/2 chosen pairs and the measurement result of each pair. Trent 
verifies if the results Alice obtained satisfy Bell state measure-
ment for the chosen ݐ/2 pairs. If Trent finds the results do not 
satisfy Bell measurement then, the channel is compromised and 
they abandon the channel. However, if the results satisfy Bell 
measurement for entanglement swapping then, Trent and Alice 
represent the remaining ݍ/2 pairs in bits and consider them as 
an initial secret key ݎ. 
 
Fig. 1. The representation of the states using classical bits. 
Let consider an attacker (Eve) listens to the classical channel 
and gains some information about the initial secret key. Then 
another level of security is needed to reduce Eve’s information. 
Therefore, Trent and Alice apply privacy amplification to derive 
a secret key with a low correlation to the initial key. We assume 
that every user shares with Trent a family of universal hash func-
tion [35] ܩܨ with a uniform distribution of hash functions ݃ 
which, maps ݊ bits input ܣ to ݉ bits output ܤ. Also, if {ݎଵ, ݎଶ} ∈ܣ and ݃	 is randomly selected then, ݃(ݎଵ) = ݃(ݎଶ) with proba-
bility of 1/|ܤ| . Trent selects a hash function ݃ ∈ ܩܨ then in-
forms Alice through the classical channel which hash function 
was selected. After, Trent and Alice feed the initial secret key 
into the hash function to obtain the final secret key ݃(ݎ) = ்݇஺௠ . 
Similarly, Trent follows the same process of verification and key 
distribution with Bob to obtain a new secret key ்݇஻௠ . 
C. Communication: 
Trent reorders the ݌ remaining entangled pairs between him 
and Alice: 
	|Υ(݅)〉்஺ = {|Υ(1)〉்஺, |Υ(2)〉்஺,… , |Υ(݌)〉்஺} (26)
and the remaining ݌ entangled pairs between him and Bob: 
	|Υ(݆)〉்஻ = {|Υ(1)〉்஻, |Υ(2)〉்஻,… , |Υ(݌)〉்஻} (27)
Then, Trent performs entanglements swapping to create entan-
glement state between Alice and Bob. Trent performs entangle-
ment swapping process using 	|Υ(݅)〉்஺ ⊗ 	|Υ(݆)〉்஻. For exam-
ple if the entangled state between Trent and Alice is 	|Υ(݅)〉்஺ =
	|Φା〉்஺  and the entangled state between Trent and Bob is 	|Υ(݆)〉்஻ = 	 |Φା〉்஻  then 	|Φା(݅)〉்஺ ⊗ 	|Φା(݆)〉்஻  is as fol-
lows: 




|0்ۧ|0ۧ஺ (|0்ۧ|0ۧ஻ + |1்ۧ|1ۧ஻)
+|1்ۧ|1ۧ஺ (|0்ۧ|0ۧ஻ + |1்ۧ|1ۧ஻) ൠ (29)
Trent applies CNOT gate on ܶ using the forst ܶ as the control 
and the second ܶ as the target: 
= 12 ൜
|0்ۧ|0ۧ஺ (|0்ۧ|0ۧ஻ + |1்ۧ|1ۧ஻)
+|1்ۧ|1ۧ஺ (|1்ۧ|0ۧ஻ + |0்ۧ|1ۧ஻) ൠ (30)
Trent apples the Hadamard gate on the first ܶ: 
= 12√2 ൜
(|0்ۧ + |1்ۧ) |0ۧ஺	(|0்ۧ|0ۧ஻ + |1்ۧ|1ۧ஻)
+(|0்ۧ − |1்ۧ)|1ۧ஺	(|1்ۧ|0ۧ஻ + |0்ۧ|1ۧ஻) ൠ (31)







Trent informs Alice and Bob about which state they share using 
two classical bits. Therefore, Alice and Bob will have their ݅ and 
݆	 states respectively entangled in one of Bell states each occur-
ring with probability of 1/4. 
|Ψି(݅, ݆)ۧ஺஻ =
1
√2 (|0ۧ஺|1ۧ஻ −	 |1ۧ஺|0ۧ஻) (33)
|Ψା(݅, ݆)ۧ஺஻ =
1
√2 (|0ۧ஺|1ۧ஻ +	 |1ۧ஺|0ۧ஻) (34)
|Φି(݅, ݆)ۧ஺஻ =
1
√2 (|0ۧ஺|0ۧ஻ −	 |1ۧ஺|1ۧ஻) (35)
|Φା(݅, ݆)ۧ஺஻ =
1
√2 (|0ۧ஺|0ۧ஻ +	 |1ۧ஺|1ۧ஻) (36)
Alice and Bob use their entangled pairs to communicate us-
ing quantum communication protocols such as teleportation, 
Ekert 91, or remote state preparation. Alice and Bob make final 
authentication to make sure that each party is the same party, 
Trent authenticated in the first process. They use the secret 
key	்݇஺ଶ௠ 	and	்݇஻ଶ௠ 	which, Trent distributed to Bob and Alice re-
spectively. Each party derives the encoding basis, then creates 
and exchanges a secret sequence. After, Alice and Bob meet on 
the classical channel to verify each other’s sequence. The legiti-
mate Alice and Bob should be able to decode and verify their 
identity. If one of them cannot decode the sequence and verify 
their identity, then they cannot trust each other and abandon the 
channel. However, if they are the legitimate Alice and Bob then, 
they will be able to decode the sequences and have mutual au-
thentication. So, Alice and Bob are authenticated to each other’s 
and able to start the communication using the entanglement-as-
sisted quantum communication protocols.  
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Mutual authentication requires the communicating parties to 
build confidence about the identity of each other’s by identifica-
tion and verification. For comparison, the quantum authentica-
tion protocol in [33] does not authenticate Trent to the communi-
cating parties Alice and Bob. The protocol assumes that Trent 
and each party share a secret, which then used by Trent to derive 
basis to encode a challenging sequence. Trent sends the encoded 
sequence and asks each party to decode it after deriving the de-
coding basis from their shared secret key with him. They retrieve 
the correct sequence then send the result to Trent to decide if 
they are the legitimate users or not. However, an attacker (Eve) 
can masquerades Trent without being detected by Alice and Bob 
because Trent uses the quantum channel to send encoded se-
quence and Alice and Bob use the classical channel to verify 
their identity. For example, Eve can intercept the communica-
tion between Alice and Trent then forge a verification process. 
Eve generates random secret key ݇ா௠ then derives encoding ba-
sis ܾா௠. After, Eve creates the sequence ܵா஺௠  then, sends it to Al-
ice. Using the secret key ்݇஺௠ , Alice derives the basis ்ܾ஺௠  then 
tries to decode the sequence ܵா஺௠ . Without identity verification 
of the source of the sequence, Alice will send the result to Trent. 
However, Eve can intercept the communication from reaching 
Trent then continues with Bob because Trent is the only one per-
forms the authentication. Even if Alice requests acknowledge-
ment from Trent then, without authentication, Eve can perform 
the replay attack. Therefore, Alice and Bob also need to authen-
ticate the identity of Trent at the initial communication. Alice 
and Bob each creates a sequence using the shared secret key with 
Trent then ask him to verify the sequence on the classical chan-
nel. Thus, Alice and Bob require Trent to verify himself and pass 
the verification step to be as well authenticated. If the mutual 
authentication succeeds then, Alice and Bob with high confi-
dence can continue communicating with Trent because they 
have mutual authentication. If not, they abandon the channel. In 
our protocol, consider Eve tries to perform the replay attack. Us-
ing the passive attack on the classical channel, Eve could capture 
acknowledgements and use them later. However, the shared se-
cret key in our protocol changes after each authentication pro-
cess. Thus, each secret key is used once and the replay attack 
cannot be effective. 
Let us consider the intercept/send attack against the authen-
tication and key distribution process. If Eve intercepts the entan-
gled pairs sent from Trent to Alice then, creates entanglement 
and share with Alice. So, Trent and Eve share |Υ(݆)〉்ா. Also, 
Eve and Alice share |Υ(݆)〉ா஺. Alice chooses random pairs then, 
performs Bell measurement to obtain an outcome with a proba-
bility of 1/4 for each measurement as in Bell measurement out-
comes (10-25). Similarly, Eve measures random pairs from the 
shared entanglement with Trent to obtain an outcome for each 
measurement with a probability of 1/4. When Alice meets Trent 
on the classical channel to inform him of the chosen pairs and 
their measurement results, Alice will not be able to provide the 
correct measurement because there is no correlation between 
their pairs. Therefore, each measurement result of Alice and 
Trent will have success probability of 1/16. As a result, Trent 
and Alice with high probability can detect the presence of Eve 
on the channel. 
V. CONCLUSION 
We presented a quantum mutual authentication protocol 
based on Bell state measurement and entanglement swapping. A 
trusted authority authenticates untrusted to each other users then 
creates an entanglement-based quantum communication chan-
nel. Using the prior shared secret key with each user, the trusted 
authority mutually authenticates each user then builds the quan-
tum channel. In addition, the protocol renews the secret key 
shared with the trusted authority after each authentication pro-
cess. The protocol successfully creates Bell states between par-
ties who their particles did not interact with each other’s before. 
Then, they use their Bell states to communicate by quantum en-
tanglement communication protocols. 
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